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Relationship: 2498
Title
SARS-CoV-2 production leads to Viral infection, proliferated
Upstream event
Downstream event
Key Event Relationship Overview
AOPs Referencing Relationship
AOP Name | Adjacency | Weight of Evidence | Quantitative Understanding | Point of Contact | Author Status | OECD Status |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Binding of SARS-CoV-2 to ACE2 leads to viral infection proliferation | adjacent | High | Not Specified | Sally Mayasich (send email) | Under development: Not open for comment. Do not cite | Under Development |
Taxonomic Applicability
Term | Scientific Term | Evidence | Link |
---|---|---|---|
mammals | mammals | High | NCBI |
Sex Applicability
Sex | Evidence |
---|---|
Unspecific | High |
Life Stage Applicability
Term | Evidence |
---|---|
All life stages | High |
Key Event Relationship Description
In the process of SARS-CoV-2 production, the genome is replicated, packaged, and assembled with the structural proteins into virions that are then released from the host cell. The virions can infect nearby cells or be transported to distal organs, or be expelled from the host through coughing, sneezing, or vocalization, or in saliva and bodily waste. The amount of virus expelled from the host is dependent on the viral load produced. The viral load quantity produced in the upstream KE 1847 through the viral hijacking and modifications of host cell resources has been measured or modelled in several studies to determine the downstream terminal KE (1939) response: actual or potential transmission and successful infection of the exposed cell, organ, or new individual host. Transmission at the population level has also been monitored based on contact tracing, or experimental infection and transmission studies, or modelling community spread. Transmission at the ecosystem level has been demonstrated with human-to-animal-to-human transmission.
Evidence Collection Strategy
The evidence collection strategy was similar to that for the other key event relationships in this AOP.
Evidence Supporting this KER
Empirical evidence supporting this relationship is described below.
Biological Plausibility
In pathogen evolution it is the nature of the virus to replicate in a host (upstream KE 1847) and take advantage of internal and external transport mechanisms to reach another suitable habitat (downstream KE/AO 1939) to replicate again and result in infection. For this AOP and specifically for this KER, it is helpful to be aware of historical development of disease theory, i.e., the germ theory of disease and Koch’s postulates from the 19th century. Importantly, the first postulate that the microbe must be found in diseased individuals but not those without symptoms, had to be revised when it was realized that some bacteria like those causing cholera and typhoid could be carried by hosts who were asymptomatic (Fredricks and Relman, 1996). Viruses were discovered and were found to only replicate in cells and cannot be grown in pure culture, confounding the second postulate. Therefore, modifications of these disease principles have been applied to viruses (Rivers, 1937), and are basically an attempt at proving causation. Fredricks and Relman (1996) present a review citing several of these important revisions and their application with current technology like sequence-based identification of pathogens to prove the biological plausibility of the causal agent moving from host to host. Interestingly, Fouchier et al. (2003) carry out a proof that Koch’s postulates, as modified by Rivers (1937), are fulfilled for the (first) SARS virus. Numerous studies on SARS-CoV-2 demonstrate both the presence of the viral sequence by PCR (viral load), and the presence of neutralizing antibodies to the virus in upstream cases as considered by Evans’ (1976) proposed ‘‘Elements of Immunological Proof of Causation.’’ These principles go on to cover the downstream event, transmission to a healthy contact, where the antibody to the agent (SARS-CoV-2) is absent prior to the disease and exposure to the agent, the antibody appears during illness, and a downstream contact with no antibodies to the agent is susceptible to infection and disease produced by the agent (Evans, 1976; Fredricks and Relman, 1996). Literature providing empirical evidence of these principles specific to SARS-CoV-2 is provided below.
Empirical Evidence
The causal agent of the COVID-19 disease, SARS-CoV-2, the stressor that is increased within a host’s cells in the upstream event, is also the stressor that infects multiple hosts (proliferates) in the downstream event. Evidence is found not only in many human studies, but also in other mammalian studies. Importantly, Worobey et al. (2022) gathered evidence within and around the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, China, with several findings on the origins of the human disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including: 1) live animals shown to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 were sold at the market in late 2019; 2) the SARS-CoV-2 virus was found in environmental samples taken from the live animal vender locations, indicating viral shedding from the animals occurred; 3) earliest known human cases of the COVID-19 disease (December 2019) were geographically centered around the market, and 4) 66% of the 41 people hospitalized with the disease by January 2, 2020 had direct exposure to the market. Pekar et al. (2022) found only two distinct viral lineages of SARS-CoV-2 before February 2020 which epidemic simulations showed were the result of two or more separate zoonotic transmission events to humans, the first lineage introduced between late October and early December, and the second lineage weeks later. Those infected with the first lineage had direct contact with the Huanan market, and those with the second lineage did not, but lived or stayed near the market during that time period (Pekar et al., 2022). This evidence indicates zoonotic transfer to humans, with spread of the disease from human to human in Wuhan as the epicenter.
In humans, as the pandemic spread, household contact studies and tracking were used to determine viral loads and secondary infections in contacts:
Bhavnani et al. (2022 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12879-022-07663-1) found an association between SARS-CoV-2 viral load in an individual with a case of COVID-19 and the risk of transmission to contacts. Among the 212 primary (index) cases assessed, median viral load was 5.6 (1.8–10.4) log10 RNA copies per mL of saliva, with 70 (19%) of their 365 contacts testing positive after exposure. Of those 70, 36 (51%) were exposed to an index case that was asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic on the day of exposure. Contacts infected increased monotonically with index case viral load, resulting in a significant association between viral load and risk of transmission (RR = 1.27, 95% CI 1.22–1.32).
- Marks et al. (2021 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30985-3) conducted a similar study in Catalonia, Spain. Of 282 patients with COVID-19 that had a total of 753 contacts, 17% (125 of 753 contacts) became infected. Infections varied from 12% when the index case viral load was less than 1 × 106 copies per mL to 24% when the index case viral load was 1 × 1010 copies per mL or more. Transmission risk increased for household contacts and by increasing age of the contact. The study results indicated that viral load of index cases was the strongest factor in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
While it has been documented that humans have passively transmitted SARS-CoV-2 back to other mammals (see KE1939), researchers have also conducted controlled exposure experiments in other mammals in which they inoculated test animals with SARS-CoV-2, measured viral shedding, and confirmed infection in contact animals:
- Freuling et al. (2020) tested raccoon dogs by administering intranasal inoculations to nine naive animals with SARS-CoV-2 2019_nCoV Muc-IMB-1, and introducing 3 naive animals 24 hours after inoculation. Six inoculated and two contact animals became infected based on viral RNA measured by qPCR in nasal, oropharyngeal, and rectal swab samples. SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA was first detected in a contact animal 7 days after contact.
- Palmer et al. (2021) conducted intranasal inoculations of white-tailed deer fawns with SARS-CoV-2, resulting in infection and shedding of infectious virus in nasal secretions. The infected animals were found to transmit the virus to contact deer.
- Martins, et al. (2022) found that white-tailed deer fawns shed infectious virus in nasal and oral secretions up to 5 days after intranasal inoculation with SARS-CoV-2 B.1 lineage, with deer-to-deer transmission occurring on day 3 post-inoculation.
- Cool, et al. 2022 investigated transmission in adult white-tailed deer co-infected with both the SARS-CoV-2 ancestral lineage A and the alpha variant of concern (VOC) B.1.1.7. Presence and transmission of each strain was determined using next-generation sequencing, with the finding that the alpha VOC B.1.1.7 isolate outcompeted ancestral lineage A. They found direct contact transmission and also vertical transmission from doe to fetus.
- Shuai et al. (2020) studied minks and showed that SARS-CoV-2 replicates efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. To investigate transmission, intranasal inoculations were administered to three animals that were then placed in a separate cages. After 24 hours, three naïve minks were placed in cages adjacent to the virus-inoculated mink without direct contact. Viral RNA was detected in the nasal washes of all three introduced animals after 3-9 days showing that SARS-CoV-2 was transmitted via respiratory droplets.
- Kim et al. (2021) found that SARS-CoV-2 replicated in 6 inoculated ferrets, and was transmitted to all 6 direct contact ferrets and two of 6 indirect contact ferrets, indicating direct contact was more efficient, but airborne transmission also occurred. Airborne transmission likely results in a lower dosage than direct contact.
Uncertainties and Inconsistencies
The main area of uncertainty is in quantifying viral load either by measuring viral RNA by PCR or by isolating the virus in cell culture and determining numbers of plaque forming units (PFU).
A review by Puhach et al. (2022 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41579-022-00822-w) points out several issues affecting quantification:
- Quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) cannot differentiate between replication-competent (infectious) virus and residual (non-infectious) viral RNA.
- RT-PCR cannot determine whether the RNA viral load is increasing or decreasing; peak viral load may have passed or has not yet been reached.
- Analytical sensitivity of measured RT-PCR cycles (Ct values) used to determine RNA copy numbers and limits of detection may vary between the tests and laboratories.
- Site of specimen collection (e.g., nasal or nasopharyngeal swabs or throat samples) can affect viral load measurement.
For cell culture, only live (infectious) viruses are counted, however:
- Quality of the sample affects success of viral culture.
- Loss of infectiousness can occur due to unsuitable storage conditions like high temperatures (requirement for −80 °C) or repeated freeze–thaw cycles.
- Cell lines used for isolation can show a high variability between laboratories.
- Culture medium or additives such as fetal bovine serum and antibiotics may affect success of viral culture.
- Infectious virus determined using Vero E6 cells might overestimate transmission risks in vivo.
Known modulating factors
Vaccination causes the production of antibodies in the host that can quickly mobilize to attack the invading virus, ultimately inhibiting viral replication and transmission. Pfizer-BioNTech (BNT162b2) vaccine using mRNA technology to deliver the viral spike protein sequence and other vaccines reduced index-to-secondary patient transmission (Eyre et al., 2022). Braeye et al. (2023) in a 2020-21 Belgian contact tracing study showed vaccine effectiveness against transmission (VET) for BNT162b2 for primary vaccination at 96% against Alpha, 87% against Delta and 31% against Omicron. Mentzer et al. (2023) found that certain human leukocyte antigen (HLA) gene alleles are associated with COVID-19 breakthrough infection in vaccinated individuals.
It is known that per- and poly-fluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS), air pollutants, and other environmental chemicals are implicated in SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility and COVID-19 disease severity (Marques et al., 2022; Nielsen et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2021). However, it is currently unknown whether or how the mechanisms of action are related to transmission risk.
The drug Remdesivir (GS-5734) is a small molecule adenosine analogue that binds to the viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase and inhibits viral replication by incorporating into the nascent viral RNA chain causing pre-mature termination (Warren et al., 2016 10.1038/nature17180). Wang et al. (2020 10.1038/s41422-020-0282-0) found remdesivir to inhibit viral yield in cell culture by more than 90%. However, Williamson et al. (2020 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2423-5) report that in rhesus macaques, remdesivir treatment did not reduce virus shedding from the upper respiratory tract but prevented disease progression to pneumonia.
Quantitative Understanding of the Linkage
Data is available for a quantitative understanding between the upstream SARS-CoV-2 production increased and the downstream host-to-host transmission proliferation key events in this KER, epitomized by the computation of the basic reproduction number (R0). The R0 is the number of secondary cases from each index case in a population, assuming no immunization, and is a fundamental epidemiological metric used as an indicator of the contagiousness or transmissibility of infectious agents in populations (Delamater et al., 2019 https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2501.171901). Interpretation of an R0 > 1 is that the virus is spreading exponentially, and if R0 < 1, the number becoming infected is decreasing. Time interval is important in the calculation; the R0 at a given time during an epidemic is called Rt or Re (effective reproduction number). The R0 varies due to viral load, regional social factors, and differences in underlying health and numbers of contacts of individuals (Karimizadeh et al., 2023).
A review and comparison of the original Wuhan strain of SARS-CoV-2 and the first SARS virus indicated that SARS-CoV-2 had higher R0 values than SARS, with SARS-CoV-2 R0 averaging 3.28 (median 2.79), exceeding WHO estimates of 1.4-2.5 (Liu et al., 2020 10.1093/jtm/taaa021). A comparison of R0 values for several variants worldwide found the highest values for Alpha (1.22), Beta (1.19), Gamma (1.21), Delta (1.38) and Omicron (1.90) from Japan, Belgium, the United States, France and South Africa, respectively (Manathunga et al., 2023 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12985-023-02018-x). A recent review cites several studies in which R0 has been calculated by various means, for the original and SARS-CoV-2 variants, in several countries (Karimizadeh et al., 2023 10.1186/s40001-023-01047-0). As an example, an Iranian study used four different models to calculate R0 for two COVID-19 variants (Sheikhi et al. 2022 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0265489). Results for the Exponential Growth Rate (EGR), Maximum Likelihood (ML), Sequential Bayesian (SB), and time-dependent susceptible, infectious, and recovered or removed (SIR) models for the Alpha variant were 0.9999 (95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.9994-1), 1.046 (95% CI: 1.044-1.049), 1.06 (95% CI: 1.03-1.08), and 2.79 (95% CI: 2.77-2.81), respectively, for March10-June 10, 2021. However, during the exponential growth period for Alpha in Iran of April 3-9, the R0 of the respective models were 2.26 (95% CI: 2.04-2.49), 2.64 (95% CI: 2.58-2.7), 11.38 (95% CI: 11.28-11.48), and 12.13 (95% CI: 12.12-12.14). For the Delta variant exponential growth period from July 3-8, 2021 R0 calculated for the respective models were 3 (95% CI: 2.34-3.66), 3.1 (95% CI: 3.02-3.17), 12 (95% CI: 11.89-12.12), and 23.3 (95% CI: 23.19-23.41), with the interval of June 22-September 22, 2021 R0 close to 1, similar to the longer interval for the Alpha variant (Sheikhi et al. 2022).
To determine the specific dose in the index case required to infect a secondary host, viral loads have been measured by using qRT-PCR to enumerate viral RNA genomes (Bhavnani et al., 2022; Marks et al., 2021) and by determining the number of infectious units in tissue culture. Such empirically determined dose-response parameters have been used in models that incorporate dynamics of the exposure pathways, such as airborne transmission (the link between viral production in the index case and infection in the contact case), as discussed below.
Response-response Relationship
Time-scale
Known Feedforward/Feedback loops influencing this KER
Multilevel feedback mechanisms have been suggested regarding behaviors such as social distancing and how they influence SARS-CoV-2 mutational adaptations geospatially (Barrett et al., 2022 https://doi.org/10.1089/cmb.2020.0343). A transfer entropy (TE) framework was used to illustrate the feedback between macrolevel dynamics of socio-behavioral measures and microlevel mutational composition of the viral population. For example, A23404G leading to the D614G mutation in the viral spike protein significantly increases the viral load in patients, in turn increasing transmission rates. Differences in culture, policy, and the severity of infections resulted in distinct selective pressures on the virus in different geospatial blocks, producing different mutational signals for human populations in California versus New York versus Washington, suggesting a feedback loop connecting socio-behavioral patterns with mutational signatures. Additionally, the framework shows adaptability of the virus based on a noncoding mutation G29540A, highly localized in NY (> 95%), and extended incubation periods in China possibly due to the pressure imposed by drastic social distancing measures (Barrett et al., 2022).
Bradley et al. (2020 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100325) use a systems approach with causal loop diagrams as tools to also illustrate the dynamics of a societal response to the threat of COVID-19. They propose CLDs that include numbers of infectious and susceptible people in feedback loops with policies that influence risk of transmission and transmission events.
Wanelik et al. (2023 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2023.106618) focus on “superspreaders”, i.e., individuals who are capable of infecting more than the average number of secondary contacts, who, evidence suggests, may be more likely to become superspreaders themselves. They used a generic model with hypothetical parameters to show that this positive feedback loop had effects on the herd immunity threshold, basic reproduction number (R0), the peak prevalence of superspreaders, and the final epidemic size.
Domain of Applicability
Taxonomic
Because this KER describes a relationship within the SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission process, the domain of susceptible species is the same for AOP 430 as a whole: humans and a broad range of mammals.
Sex and Age
Age was indicated as a factor in tendency to become infected (Marks et al., 2021); another study found no statistically significant difference in viral loads between age groups or sex (Carrouel et al., https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2021.786042).